

1960

die models in the automotive industry is reported to save manufacturers many millions each year.

What does the future hold? The present program covers the following broad categories:

First. Wood quality: Better knowledge of wood quality in standing timber will enable more exact appraisal of value, and form a basis for quality control in manufacture. Logs can be selected for highest potential use; outstanding trees can be selected for breeding of superior trees. All this means better returns for the timber owner—public or private—and for forest-based industries.

Second. Solid wood products: Better glues and gluing techniques; better and less wasteful methods of producing lumber and veneers; composite products of wood with plastics, paper, and metals; and improved boards made of wood particles will make possible more profitable new industries.

Third. Physics and engineering applications: Better knowledge of physical and engineering properties of wood will permit more economical use, and will lead to radically new structural systems and stressed-shelf types of construction for homes and other buildings. Some Senators have seen the hyperbolic-paraboloid structure at the Oregon Centennial Exhibition in Portland, Oreg. This is one example of what can be done with stressed shapes.

Fourth. Pulp, paper, and chemical products: Only the surface has been scratched as far as pulp and chemical products from wood are concerned. This is of tremendous importance since new uses permit better forest management by providing a market for thinnings and low-quality trees. Already, laboratory chemistry has provided knowledge of chemical reactions which show great promise. There remains the costly pilot plant development of commercial processes. For example, the present commercial source of supply for one of the main ingredients of nylon—furfural—is considered inadequate for future demand. Commercial production of furfural and other important chemicals from wood has been shown to be technically feasible.

The history of accomplishments and a brief look into the future truly excites one's imagination for the future of timber as a raw material. These developments will provide more jobs, expand the tax base, and give a better living for us all. It offers hope for new economic life for presently depressed areas such as the northern part of my own State of Wisconsin. The staff of the Forest Products Laboratory will welcome all to the formal celebration of the Laboratory's golden jubilee on June 2, 3, and 4, of this year.

I hope as many members of this body as possible will take the first opportunity to visit the Laboratory personally. I can assure that they will meet a devoted, hard-working, and dedicated group of scientists and supporting personnel. They would consider it a privilege to tell Senators of their work and their aspirations, and I am confident

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

1931

they would find a visit to the Forest Products Laboratory a thrilling and enlightening experience.

NATIONAL PEACE AGENCY ACT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I introduce a bill which has as its purpose the creating and prescribing of the functions of a National Peace Agency.

The bill is a companion measure, at least in its general purpose, to a similar bill introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 9305.

The purpose of this particular measure is to deal with problems related to achieving peace through arms limitation agreements, to developing international control and inspection systems to enforce such agreements, and to applying scientific and technical resources to promote peace by eliminating or reducing the economic causes of war.

Mr. President, the test ban negotiations which are being conducted in Geneva are a test of the willingness of the nuclear powers to take practical steps toward the avowed goal of total disarmament. Progress has been made toward a test ban agreement, but there have also been some setbacks. Our negotiations and indeed our Nation are challenged to show great patience and preparation in the face of technical, military, and political obstacles in the path of agreement. The outcome of the Geneva test ban negotiations will, in large part, determine whether meaningful progress can be made in outlawing weapons of mass destruction without jeopardizing the national security of any nation.

The test ban negotiations, I believe, have at least a better than an even chance of being successful. We have pursued lesser goals under greater odds. One of the great problems impeding progress now is the matter of developing appropriate control measures to safeguard an agreement by insuring that violations are detected. It is this crucial matter of technical controls that I wish to discuss at this time, Mr. President.

Today I introduce a bill to create a National Peace Agency to conduct studies and research first, for the development of international control and inspection systems to accompany specific disarmament or arms control agreements and second, to promote peace and freedom by eliminating or reducing the economic and social causes of war. Such an agency, in effect, would be a peace agency in that it would deal with problems related to achieving peace through arms limitation agreements and through the development of the necessary control and inspection systems to enforce such agreements. Also it would provide for research and development to solve the problems of underdeveloped nations in such areas as food production, conservation of mineral and water resources, medicine and health, and education.

It is firm U.S. policy that all agreements for the reduction of armaments must include measures for controls. I concur in this policy wholeheartedly. Without such measures, agreements are likely to be worth less than the paper on which they are written.

Much time and serious consideration have been devoted to the technical difficulties in detecting and identifying nuclear tests. Sufficient control apparatus is available to reliably detect aerial, surface, and underwater explosions, but there is still room for much improvement. One of the greatest technical difficulties at this time is in establishing adequate control apparatus to detect underground explosions. More research is needed.

During the summer of 1958, the Western delegation met with the delegation of the Soviet bloc countries at the Geneva conference of experts to study the methods of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The experts concluded that with the technology and instruments existing at that time, 90 percent of the earthquakes equivalent to a nuclear explosion of five kilotons or greater could be identified, but that the identification of the remaining 10 percent would be doubtful. The negotiators proceeded to draft a treaty based on these findings.

Mr. President, the conclusions of this conference of experts have been discussed by me and other members of the Senate at some length, and I shall not deal with them in detail here.

In January of last year the United States presented new data on the detection and identification of underground explosions to the effect that it is more difficult to identify such explosions than was previously believed. The Soviets rejected this new data. They refused to give objective consideration to it. The effect of the Soviet action was to bog down the negotiations on the matter of technical controls. If allowed to continue, the disagreement between the United States and Soviet scientists could scuttle chances for reaching an agreement.

One positive effect of the new data has been to prompt further research and study on detection methods. Already new methods have been developed, and there are promising techniques for further improvements. It is certain that improvements can be made so that the risk to the United States of entering into a test ban agreement will not be significantly increased.

I should like to say a few words, Mr. President, about the matter of risks. The fact that a 100 percent foolproof detection system has not been devised is being held up by some as a great bugaboo to nullify sincere efforts to achieve an adequately controlled treaty. Those who are skeptical about the degree of perfection in a control system refuse to recognize the fact that the risks involved in a less than perfect control system are not so great as the risks involved in standing idly by and allowing the negotiations to collapse. As President Eisenhower pointed out recently, even the most carefully elaborated disarmament agreements are likely to entail some risks of evasion, "but one must ponder, in reaching decisions on the very complex and difficult subject of arms control, the enormous risks entailed if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the international competition in arma-

1932

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 4

ments and to move effectively in the direction of disarmament."

We must recognize that no system can be made absolutely perfect or foolproof. But knowing that perfection is not attainable does not mean that we would be relying on good faith in any test ban agreement. We are attempting to construct a control system that will deter a violator because he can never be sure that he will not get caught. This is the principle of deterrence. In other words, Mr. President, we must neither belittle the new scientific data nor conclude rashly that an effective control system is impossible. We must make whatever improvements are deemed feasible and warranted to set up an effective control system. Our Government is doing the best it can, under the handicap of working on a limited basis, to effect the necessary improvements.

At present, research on control systems is being conducted under the auspices of the AEC, the Department of Defense, and the President's Science Advisory Committee. It is important to note, that, although we have placed great emphasis on the matter of controls, none of these agencies is concerned primarily with developing control systems. This is indicative of the kind of temporary and oftentimes makeshift preparations which I have often scored on the floor of the Senate. Mr. President, as long as I have been associated with the disarmament problems—back to 1955—the United States has not once entered negotiations adequately prepared. At this time, existing governmental machinery for the development of technology for peace is sorely inadequate.

In the military field, we have geared ourselves to keep pace with the rapid advance of technology. Technological and scientific progress in the past two decades have prompted a complete revolution of the nature of warfare and of the instruments and methods of war. To equal the challenge of this—the age of space and pentomic warfare—we are spending almost two-thirds of our annual national budget on defense, and a very significant portion of this amount is for research, test, evaluation, and development of newer and better facilities for destruction. This drive of the great powers of the world to keep pace with technological innovations in the military sphere is a key reason for the present armaments stalemate, for the international unrest, and, what is more, for the need to exert greater technical and scientific efforts for peace.

Mr. President, this is why I am today proposing an Agency to marshall the scientific talent of our country, to draw upon its technical resources, and to make greater strides toward the development of an effective and workable world security system. The Agency I am proposing would operate just as existing independent agencies in reporting directly to the President. Due to the nature of its work, it will work very closely with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies. As I pointed out earlier, the basic ob-

jectives of this Agency will be to deal with problems related to achieving peace through arms limitation agreements, to developing international control and inspection systems. In general, its goal would be to open the way to disarmament agreements through the development of means and methods of safeguarding such agreements.

Briefly, Mr. President, I would like to review just what it is that the United States is seeking in the area of disarmament or arms control so that as I list the kinds of programs this new Agency would undertake, it will be clear that the work of the Agency would be to implement the goals which we have already declared. Our disarmament goals consist of the following points: First, discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests; second, prevention of surprise attack; third, prohibition of fissionable material production for weapons purposes; fourth, transfer of fissionable material from weapons to peaceful purposes; fifth, reduction of armed forces; sixth, transfer of selected armaments to international depots; seventh, prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries; eighth, establishment of a committee to study ways to insure that objects sent into outer space will be used exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes; and ninth, the grant of authority to an international agency to study the control of the export and importation of armaments.

The National Peace Agency which I am proposing would undertake programs for research and development relating to overall problems of disarmament, arms limitations, and inspection and control systems. More specifically, it would conduct programs for the development of systems for monitoring nuclear tests, for monitoring, detecting, and identifying missile and satellite tests, and for the development of techniques for aerial reconnaissance inspections.

It would develop new analytic organizations to generate new ideas and concepts applicable to systems and techniques for arms limitation, and to conduct general disarmament studies.

Furthermore, Mr. President, this Agency would undertake programs for the support of studies and research on such projects as the following: First, techniques for limiting the use of space for military purposes; second, techniques associated with communications systems for inspection purposes; third, techniques relating to conventional armament inspection and detection systems; fourth, inspection techniques involved in limited warfare situations; fifth, surprise attack detection systems; sixth, monitoring techniques appropriate to the submarine problem; seventh, legal aspects of national sovereignty extended to the space domain and freedom of the seas, insofar as they contribute to the possibility of war; eighth, analyses of the effects of disarmament agreements upon national economies; and ninth, scientific and technical problems which contribute to the possibility of war.

From the outline I have just given, I think it is clear that this Agency would be working within the context of the dis-

armament proposals which we have put forward. Its sole purpose would be to further studies and research for the development of the necessary safeguards against violations of any arms control agreement in which we might take part. It is time that our efforts along this line take on the characteristics of permanency and all-out dedication. Our thinking must be grounded in the best technological and scientific knowledge available. This is the only way we can negotiate effectively with the Soviets.

Mr. President, this is the kind of effort I had in mind when I rose on this floor and in various committees to urge the passage of an appropriation to permit the Departments of State and Defense to jointly contract for special foreign policy studies relating to disarmament, weapons control, and possible technical means for reduction of arms agreement.

I believe that this is the kind of effort Dr. James R. Killian, the President's former advisor for science and technology, had in mind last July when he stressed the need for more research on the requirements for acceptable arms limitations arrangements. He said:

In the Geneva conference on nuclear test cessation and prevention of surprise attack, we have seen that scientific and technological considerations have an important bearing on possible international agreements in these areas. Without detracting from our national ability and alertness to keep ahead in military technology, we should seek to explore every promising opportunity to apply science and technology to the solution of the complex military and political problems associated with arms limitations.

I believe that this is the kind of effort the Disarmament Subcommittee had in mind when it reported unanimously:

The subcommittee is struck by the disparity in the effort the world is putting into thought and action for controlling and reducing armaments and the effort going into the development, fabrication, and buildup of armaments. It strongly urges the executive branch to remedy this situation.

I believe that such an agency could realize the recommendations of the Berkner Panel, which pointed out the advancement of the Soviet Union in seismic research and recommended improvements in detection and identification instruments.

Mr. President, I prize very highly our system of government, including the use of the minimum number of Federal agencies for conducting the Nation's business. I feel very strongly that the proliferation of Federal agencies and offices could seriously impair our national ability to conduct forthrightly and promptly the affairs of Government. On the other hand, I consider it a sad reflection on the Nation to make ad hoc arrangements in such a vital area as disarmament. I have thought this matter over for some time and quite thoroughly. Were it possible to use some existing Federal facility for conducting studies and research for the development of control systems, I would recommend its use. No such facility is available. As I pointed out earlier, the Government is doing the best it can under present arrangements.

Present governmental machinery for international arms control agreements consists of the following: an ambassador and a small staff presently assigned to the Geneva test ban negotiations; Office of the Special Assistant for Arms Limitation in the Department of State, including about 20 staff members; a section in the Office of the Secretary of Defense known as the Office for International Security Affairs, consisting of a small staff of professionals with part-time assistance from experts from the three military services, and the temporary Joint Disarmament Study, recently appointed by the President. The study group consisting of about 18 persons, is assisted from time to time by the staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Although I will be the first to commend all of these persons for their outstanding efforts, I do not think this kind of here-there-and-everywhere arrangement is capable of producing the kind of results we need. Considering all Government efforts, including its extra-governmental assistance, in the area of arms control, the total machinery boils down to a small number of part-time workers, and a handful of experts working on a full-time basis. This is why I conclude, Mr. President, that we have no single, special agency to explore and pursue the technical problems of arms control and the paths to peace.

In view of the fact that we are a peace-loving nation and in view of the fact that we are perhaps closer to making real progress in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction than at any time before, I think it is time to make a full-time, coordinated all-out effort for arms control.

Peace is indeed the hope of the world. If solid blocks are not laid now to curb the arms race, our task will become increasingly more difficult and our goal increasingly more elusive.

Therefore, Mr. President, I propose that we make a dramatic show of our good faith and sincerity in establishing a special agency to deal with the difficult technical problems of arms control and obstacles to our quest for a just and lasting peace. I urge my colleagues to give serious consideration to my proposal, and I solicit their support and suggestions.

From time to time, after the introduction of this bill, it is my intention to direct my remarks to certain features of the bill. This is a very comprehensive measure. My colleagues will recall that the Democratic Advisory Council made a proposal along these lines. The proposal of the Democratic Advisory Council is very comprehensive and all-embracing. I believe it merits sincere and serious consideration in the Congress.

I introduced this particular proposal because of the need for emphasis on peace by this Government—not peace as a byproduct of defense or as a byproduct of the State Department, but, rather, as a concerted, determined effort by the Government of the United States to dramatize our sincere dedication to the cause of a just and enduring peace.

I note the presence of the distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], who, sometime ago, addressed himself to this very subject and gave one of the most inspiring and at the same time one of the most informative addresses I have heard on the subject of a national policy directed toward the attainment of peace with justice and freedom.

Mr. President, none of us has a monopoly on these matters. The best we can do is make a sincere approach and a concentrated effort. My efforts, late as they are being made tonight, have for their purpose the placing before the Senate of this particular proposal, seeking suggestions, seeking amendments, seeking alterations that might improve the bill.

From time to time, as I have indicated, I shall offer suggestions in the form of addresses before the Senate or some other place in our country, where we can promote public attention and a sincere consideration of this vital proposition.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 2989) to create and prescribe the functions of a National Peace Agency, introduced by Mr. HUMPHREY, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "National Peace Agency Act".

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

SEC. 2. It is the purpose of this Act to deal with problems related to achieving peace through arms limitation agreements, to developing international control and inspection systems to enforce such agreements, and to applying scientific and technical resources to promote peace by eliminating or reducing the economic causes of war.

CREATION AND FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL PEACE AGENCY

SEC. 3. There is hereby established the National Peace Agency (hereinafter called the "Agency"). The Agency shall undertake programs to carry out the purpose of this Act, including, among others, programs—

(1) for research and development bearing upon the science and technology of nuclear test monitoring,

(2) for design, engineering and testing of experimental systems for monitoring nuclear tests,

(3) for research and development relating to systems and instruments for detecting and identifying missile and satellite tests,

(4) for design, engineering and testing of experimental systems for monitoring missile and satellite tests,

(5) for development and testing of satellites for monitoring nuclear tests in cosmic space,

(6) for research and development in the techniques of aerial reconnaissance inspection,

(7) for research and development relating to overall problems of disarmament, arms limitations, and inspection and control systems.

(8) for development and application of communications and advanced computer techniques for analyzing the problems involved in inspection of national budgets and economic indicators as they bear upon disarmament inspection systems.

(9) for development of new analytic organizations to—

(A) apply the techniques of operations research to peace problems in the same way that "war gaming" is conducted for the military problems,

(B) generate new ideas and concepts applicable to systems and techniques for arms limitation,

(C) conduct general disarmament studies.

(10) for support of studies and research on projects such as—

(A) techniques for limiting the use of space for military purposes,

(B) techniques associated with communications systems for inspection purposes,

(C) techniques relating to conventional armament inspection and detection systems,

(D) inspection techniques involved in limited warfare situations,

(E) surprise attack detection systems,

(F) monitoring techniques appropriate to the submarine problem,

(G) legal aspects of national sovereignty extended to the space domain and freedom of the seas, insofar as they contribute to the possibility of war,

(H) analyses of the effects of disarmament agreements upon national economies, and

(I) scientific and technical problems which contribute to the possibility of war.

(11) to investigate on a continuing basis the broad aspects of the effects of radiation upon man,

(12) for research on educational techniques aimed at rendering underdeveloped nations less technologically dependent,

(13) for research and development on problems of underdeveloped nations insofar as they contribute to international instability and tensions in such areas as food production, conservation of mineral and water resources (including desalination of sea and brackish water), practical power-generating systems and medicine and health.

LABORATORY FOR PEACE

SEC. 4. The Director of the Agency shall establish in the Agency a Laboratory for Peace through which the Agency shall develop and administer its research and study programs. In carrying on such programs the Agency shall enter into contracts with educational and research institutions within the United States and abroad with a view to obtaining the benefits of scientific and intellectual resources, wherever located in the world.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AGENCIES

SEC. 5. The President shall establish procedure designed to insure that the Agency will carry out its functions in close collaboration with the other agencies of the Government, but without duplicating the efforts of any such agency. Such procedures shall also provide that information available to other agencies will be made available to the National Peace Agency, and shall prescribe other means by which other agencies of the Government may support the efforts of the National Peace Agency.

DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE AGENCY

SEC. 6. (a) The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$22,500 per annum.

1934

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 4

Under the supervision and direction of the President, the Director shall be responsible for the exercise of all powers and the discharge of all duties of the Agency, and shall have authority and control over all personnel and activities thereof.

(b) There shall be in the Agency a Deputy Director, who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall receive compensation at the rate of \$21,500 per annum, and shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Director may prescribe. The Deputy Director shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability.

ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 7. (a) In the performance of its functions the Agency is authorized—

(1) to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of its operations and the exercise of the powers vested in it by law;

(2) to appoint and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out such functions. Such officers and employees shall be appointed in accordance with the civil-service laws and their compensation fixed in accordance with the Classification Act of 1949;

(3) to accept unconditional gifts or donations of services, money, or property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible;

(4) without regard to section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529), to enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropriate, with any agency or instrumentality of the United States, or with any State, territory, or possession, or with any political subdivision thereof, or with any person, firm, association, corporation, or educational institution. To the maximum extent practicable and consistent with the accomplishment of the purpose of this Act, such contracts, leases, agreements, and other transactions shall be allocated by the Director in a manner which will enable small business concerns to participate equitably and proportionately in the conduct of the work of the Agency;

(5) to use, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel, and facilities of Federal and other agencies with or without reimbursement, and on a similar basis to cooperate with other public and private agencies and instrumentalities in the use of services, equipment, and facilities. Each department and agency of the Federal Government shall cooperate fully with the Agency in making its services, equipment, personnel, and facilities available to the Agency, and any such department or agency is authorized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to transfer to or to receive from the Agency, without reimbursement, supplies and equipment other than administrative supplies or equipment;

(6) to appoint such advisory committees as may be appropriate for purposes of consultation and advice to the Agency in the performance of its functions;

(7) to establish within the Agency such offices and procedures as may be appropriate to provide for the greatest possible coordination of its activities under this Act with related activities being carried on by other public and private agencies and organizations;

(8) when determined by the Director to be necessary, and subject to such security investigations as he may determine to be appropriate, to employ aliens without regard to statutory provisions prohibiting payment of compensation to aliens;

(9) to employ retired commissioned officers of the Armed Forces of the United States and compensate them at the rate

established for the positions occupied by them within the administration, subject only to the limitations in pay set forth in section 212 of the Act of June 30, 1932, as amended (5 U.S.C. 59a); and

(10) with the approval of the President, to enter into cooperative agreements under which members of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps may be detailed by the appropriate Secretary for services in the performance of functions under this Act to the same extent as that to which they might be lawfully assigned in the Department of Defense.

INFORMATION AND SECURITY

Sec. 8. In order to promote the free flow and exchange of new ideas and concepts in the new technology of peace research and development, the Agency shall, so far as possible, have all research efforts of the Agency performed in subject matter not requiring classification for security purposes. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to change or modify security procedures or to exempt personnel of the Agency from being required to obtain security clearance before obtaining classified information.

STRENGTHENING THE WORLD COURT

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, it is indeed heartening to note the increasing support for my resolution to repeal the self-judging reserve clause contained in our acceptance of jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

One of the West's most distinguished journals, the San Francisco Chronicle, has published a lead editorial giving strong support to repeal of this provision. I particularly want to underline one brief section of this thoughtful editorial:

This veto power puts the United States in the odd position of acting as its own judge in various cases submitted to the World Court. This obviously weakens the Court's power and diminishes its stature. It likewise opens to doubt and question the sincerity of U.S. affirmations in behalf of international law. * * * The reservation is superfluous and worse than useless in that it is serving both the Nation and the cause of international justice extremely ill.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this editorial from the San Francisco Chronicle of January 28 be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GO THE WHOLE WAY INTO WORLD COURT

Secretary of State Herter and Attorney General Rogers appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday to open the administration fight for repeal of the so-called Connally amendment—an unfortunate reservation that throws a long shadow over this Nation's advocacy of the rule of law in international affairs.

The amendment was put forward by the late Senator Tom Connally, of Texas, in 1948 when the United States accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, then newly set up by the United Nations. It reserved to the United States the right to decide for itself whether a matter lies within domestic jurisdiction and beyond that of the World Court.

As President Eisenhower has noted in twice urging its repeal, this veto power puts the United States in the odd position of acting as its own judge in various cases submitted to the World Court. This obviously weakens the court's power and diminishes its stature. It likewise opens to doubt and ques-

tion the sincerity of U.S. affirmations in behalf of international law.

In testifying yesterday, both administration spokesmen observed that repeal of the reservation would greatly enhance U.S. prestige. Secretary Herter added that the reservation is utterly inconsistent with American policy for the settlement of international disputes and constitutes an untenable restriction on our participation in the World Court.

Persistent fears that repeal would permit foreign control of purely domestic matters were termed a "misapprehension" by the witnesses. Domestic issues, they said, are clearly beyond jurisdiction of the court.

Secretary Herter observed that even if such matters as immigration, tariffs, and the Panama Canal should come under the court's scrutiny, U.S. policy and actions are such that this country need never fear impartial international adjudication.

The case for repeal has become so plain that President Eisenhower has twice in consecutive state of the Union messages called for it with all promptness. The reservation of the Connally amendment is superfluous and worse than useless in that it is serving both this Nation and the cause of international justice extremely ill. The Senate should forthwith forswear it and permit the United States to adhere unreservedly with other nations to this instrument of world law.

POSTAL PAY

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I was grievously disappointed in the President's statement in his budget message that he did not intend to recommend a pay raise for postal and Federal employees. Instead, he stated that he was recommending a study of existing pay schedules.

In the postal service, the Post Office Department had a Fry study in 1954 and a departmental study in 1955 which resulted in Public Law 68, a law that was so perfect—we were told when we attempted to amend it—that its perfection would be marred by any type of amendments. The law was sacrosanct. Utopia in pay classification had been attained.

Now we are told by the Chief Executive that more studies are needed. The only thing I find wrong with Public Law 68 and the Federal employees' pay schedule is that they do not provide sufficient pay to meet the demands of the present-day American standard of living.

But we are told that a study is needed. I sincerely hope that the poorly paid postal employees do not attempt to pay their rent or grocery bill with a joint committee study. I know that the landlord and the merchant in Minnesota will not look upon such a study as legal tender.

The postal employee under the present pay scale receives less pay than the unskilled worker. Three Presidential vetoes have put his pay rate several years behind that of his fellow worker in private industry. Yet the President declared:

Pending development and adoption of such a comprehensive policy, a general pay raise would be unwarranted, unfair to the taxpayers of the United States, and inequitable as among employees compensated under different and unrelated pay systems.

As far as I am concerned, the premise for the need for such a study has not been fully established and, if inequities